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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
Ad1ninistrative Appeal Decision Notice 
Inmate Name: LEVEA, WILLIAM 
NYSIDN 
Dept. DIN#: 11B0677 
Appearances: 
For the Board, the Appeals Unit 
For Appellant: 
Joseph Petito, Esq. 
2 Austin Court 
Facility: FishkHI Correctional Facility 
Appeal Control #: 08-068-17 B 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12603 
Board Member(s) who participated in appealed from decision: Thompson, Alexander, J. Smith. 
Decision appealed from: 7/2017 Denial of Discretionary Release; 24-month hold. 
Pleadings considered: 
Brief on behalf of the Appellant submitted on: October 15, 2018. 
Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation. 
Documents relied upon: 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release 
Decision Notice (Form 9026), Offender Case Plan. 
Final Determination: The undersigned have determined that the decision from which this appeal was taken 
~
be and the same is hereby 
A~ .~ ~firmed Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to-----
Comm1ss ner 
~ . . 
' I I ••"\C/ ~ Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to -----
Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to-----
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be a11nexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep~rate findj_r:$s of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on .fd~'fjfi' CO 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Inmate - Inmate's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (5/2011) 
STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
STATEMENT OF APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Inmate Name: LEVEA, WILLIAM 
Dept. DIN#: 11B0677 
Page:l 
Facility: Fishkill C01Tectional Facility 
Appeal Control #: 08-068-17 B 
Appellant raises various issues in the brief submitted in suppo1t of the administrative appeal 
he initiated following the Board of Parole's decision to deny his immediate release to community 
supervision following an interview held on or about July 25, 2017. The brief was signed and 
submitted by Appellant's counsel. The Appeals Unit has reviewed each of the issues raised by 
Appellant and finds that the issues have no merit. 
The issues raised by Appellant are as follows: (1) the Board's decision was arbitra1y and 
capricious and unlawful, with the Board placing too much weight on Appellant's prior criminal 
record, and insufficient weight being provided to his institutional achievements; (2) the Board 
failed to grant for Appellant; (3) the Board should not have considered 
issues relating to Appellant's institutional programming; (4) the Board's decision was made in 
violation of Appellant's due process rights; (5) the Board's decision lacked sufficient detail; (6) 
the Board's decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; (7) the twenty-four month 
hold imposed by the Board following the interview was excessive; (8) the Board interview was 
too sho1t in duration; (9) the Board did not provide Appellant with guidance as to how to improve 
his chances for parole release; and (10) a COMPAS instrnment was not prepared for Appellant 
and therefore not available for the Board's consideration at the time of the interview. 
As a preliminaiy matter, Appellant inconectly reads Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) as 
requiring that the Boai·d state in its decision that his release would so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law. The statute only requires that the Board consider 
that factor, among many others, when making its dete1mination. Appellant also sets fo1th language 
purpo1ted to be taken from Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(v), but the language he provides in 
his brief does not exactly match the language as it appears in that statute. Additionally, the 
language set forth by Appellant supposedly contained in 9 NYCRR §8002.3(a) and (b) is not 
accurate. Continuing, Appellant refers to "guidelines" he claims are contained in "9 NYCRR 
§8002.3(b)(l)-(3)", but again, the language he provides is inaccurate as the provisions of that 
regulation were changed substantially some time ago. Finally, Appellant seems to have 
overlooked major changes in the law governing parole release considerations that substituted the 
"guidelines" he refers to with "procedures" that incorporate risk and needs principles. This is a 
major change in the law that took place in 2011 . Appellant and his counsel ai·e strongly urged to 
carefully exainine Chapter 62 of the Laws of 2011 and the many major changes that this Chapter 
made with respect to parole release decisions made by the Boai·d of Pai·ole, and to conect any 
future appellate brief submissions accordingly. 
As to the first issue raised by Appellant in his brief, the legal standai·d governing the 
decision-making process of the Board when assessing the suitability of an inmate's possible release 
to community supervision is: (1) whether or not there is a reasonable probability that the inmate, 
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if released, will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; (2) whether or not the inmate’s 
release is incompatible with the welfare of society; and (3) whether or not the inmate’s release will 
so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for law. See Executive Law 
§§259-c(4), 259-i(2)(c)(A); Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2010); Matter of 
Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014).  In the instant case, 
the Board considered each of these three standards and specifically relied upon standard (1) in 
making its determination to deny Appellant’s release to community supervision and further found 
that it was not convinced that Appellant would live and remain at liberty without violating the law. 
 
          “Clearly, the Board of Parole has been vested with an extraordinary degree of responsibility 
in determining who will go free and who will remain in prison, and a [inmate] who seeks to obtain 
judicial review on the grounds that the Board did not properly consider all of the relevant factors, 
or that an improper factor was considered, bears a heavy burden.” Garcia v. New York State Div. 
of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239 (1st Dep't 1997) (emphasis added). See also Matter of Phillips v. 
Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17 (1st Dept. 2007). 
 
Unless Appellant is able to demonstrate convincing evidence to the contrary, the Board is 
presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial 
intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality to the extent that it borders 
on impropriety. Matter of Jackson v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 701 (2d Dept. 2014); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992 (3rd Dept. 2014); Matter of Thomches v. Evans,  
108 A.D.3d 724 (2d Dept. 2013).   
 
In determining whether to grant parole to an inmate, the Board is required to consider a 
number of statutory factors (see Executive Law §§259-c(4); 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 NYCRR §8002.2).  
In addition, the Board’s decision must detail the reasons for a denial of discretionary release (see 
Executive Law §259–i(2)(a)(i)).  However, the Board is not required to give each factor it 
considered equal weight (Matter of Arena v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community 
Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
130 A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Vigliotti v. State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d  
789 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948 (2d Dept. 
2012); Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690 (2d Dept. 2010)), and its 
actual or perceived emphasis on a specific factor is not improper as long as the Board complied with 
statutory requirements. Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Collado v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 287 A.D.2d 921 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Rivera v. Executive 
Department, Board of Parole, 268 A.D.2d 928 (3d Dept. 2000).   
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The Board is entitled to afford more weight to the nature and seriousness of the underlying 
crime(s) and the inmate’s criminal history than other factors. See Matter of Perez v. Evans, 76 
A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dept. 2010).  In this regard, the denial of release to community supervision 
primarily because of the gravity of the inmate’s crime is appropriate. Karlin v. Alexander, 57 A.D.3d 
1156 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Alamo v. New York State Div. of Parole, 52 A.D.3d 1163 (3d 
Dept. 2008); Matter of Flood v. Travis, 17 A.D.3d 757 (3d Dept. 2005).   
 
             The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the First Department decision in Matter of Siao-
Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105 (1st Dept. 2008), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008), in which the Appellate 
Court held: (1) it is not improper for the Board to primarily base its decision to deny parole release 
on the seriousness of the offense(s); (2) the weight to be assigned to each factor considered by the 
Board in making its determination is to be made solely by the Board; (3) parole release should not 
granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined; 
and (4) the Board can consider the credibility of statements made by the inmate in regard to 
whether full responsibility was taken for the criminal behavior.  
 
So long as the decision denying release to community supervision is made in accordance 
with statutory requirements, it is not to be set aside when subject to administrative or judicial review, 
particularly given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial 
determinations. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Martinez v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Burress v. Evans, 
107 A.D.3d 1216 (3d Dept. 2013). 
  
            An inmate is not automatically entitled to release to community supervision merely because 
of achievements within a prison’s institutional setting, no matter how numerous. Pearl v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058 (3d Dept. 2006); Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142 (3d Dept. 2006); Rivera v. Travis, 289 A.D.2d 829 (3d Dept. 2001).  In addition, per 
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), an application for release to community supervision shall not be 
granted merely as a reward for Appellant’s good conduct or achievements while incarcerated. Matter 
of Larrier v. New York State Board of Parole Appeals Unit, 283 A.D.2d 700 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Therefore, a determination that the inmate’s exemplary achievements are outweighed by the 
severity of the crimes is within the Board’s discretion. Matter of Anthony v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 17 A.D.3d 301 (1st Dept. 2005); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 
(2d Dept. 2004). 
 
           Appellant has the burden of showing that the Board's determination was irrational, bordering 
on impropriety, and therefore arbitrary and capricious, before administrative or judicial intervention  
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is wananted. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000); Singh v. Dennison, 107 AD. 3d 
1274 (3d Dept. 2013). It is not the fonction of the Appeals Unit to assess whether the Board gave 
proper weight to the relevant factors , but only whether the Board followed applicable legal 
authority when rendering its decision, and that is suppo1ted, and not contradicted, by the facts in 
the record. Matter of Comfo1t v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295 (3d Dept. 
2009); ~Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268. The 
weight to be accorded each of the requisite factors remains solely a matter of the Parole Board's 
discretion. See Matter of Dolan v . New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Singh v . Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Khatib v . New York 
State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Montane v . Evans, 116 A.D.3d 
197 (3d Dept.), leave to appeal granted, 23 N.Y.3d 903, appeal disinissed, 24 N.Y.3d 1052 (2014). 
Appellant has not demonstrated any abuse on the pa1t of the Board in its decision-making process that 
would wanant a de novo release inte1view. 
As to the third issue, the Board must consider Appellant's institutional record when 
assessing his suitability for possible release to community supervision. See Executive Law §259-
i(2)( c)(A); 9 N .Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(d). 
As to the fomth issue, Appellant claims that a constitutionally protected due process right 
was violated by the Board in making its dete1mination. Initially, we note that the Supreme Comt has 
held that because a person's libe1ty interest is extinguished upon conviction, there is no inherent 
right, or right under the U.S . Constitution, to parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal 
and Conectional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Hewitt v . Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) . Likewise, 
there is no due process right to parole under the New York State Constitution. Boothe v. Hammock, 
605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 69; Matter of Freeman v. New York 
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State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 2005). Thus, the protections of the due process 
clause do not apply to the Parole Board’s determinations as to whether an inmate should be released 
to parole supervision. Maldonado v. Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183163 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Barrow v. Vanburen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181466 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 
169 (2d Cir. 2001).  We recognize, however, that while an inmate has no vested right to parole 
release under the due process clause, there is a liberty interest which requires, as a matter of 
procedural due process, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of the reasons for the denial 
of release.  Therefore, in deciding whether to grant or deny parole, all the Board must do is: (1) 
afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard, and (2) if parole is denied, provide the reasons for 
the denial. Thurman v. Allard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18904 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Blackett v. 
Thomas, 293 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gittens v. Thomas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Appellant received both of these constitutional protections and, therefore, any 
arguments alleging that the Board’s decision was made in violation of the due process clause, and 
in contravention of a liberty interest arising from the due process clause, are without merit. 
 
As to the fifth issue, when read against settled case law and the interview transcript, it 
cannot be said that the reasons provided by the Board in its decision denying Appellant’s release 
to community supervision were improper or proscribed under §259-i(2)(c)(A) of the Executive 
Law.  The reasons provided for denying Appellant’s release to community supervision were 
properly detailed as required by the Executive Law and not stated in conclusory terms, and further, 
were supported by the record.  The Board’s decision denying Appellant’s release to community 
supervision is rational and should be sustained.  Corley v. New York State Division of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Dorman v. New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 
880 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Matter of Cornejo v. New York State Division of Parole, 269 A.D.2d 713 (3d Dept. 
2000).   
 
Since the Board's decision was sufficiently detailed to apprise Appellant of the reasons for 
the denial of parole release, no further detail was necessary. Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d  
742 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 A.D.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 1993).  Furthermore, there are no statutory, regulatory or due process requirements that the 
internal deliberations or discussions of the Board following its interview with a parole eligible 
inmate appear on the record. Matter of Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733(4th Dept. 1983); 
Matter of Dow v. Hammock, 118 Misc.2d 462 (Sup. Ct., Wyoming Co., March 31, 1983).  
 
 As to the sixth issue, Appellant’s claim that the denial of parole release amounted to a 
resentencing is without merit. Matter of Valentino v. Evans, 92 A.D.3d 1054 (3d Dept. 2012); 
Matter of Kalwasinski v. Paterson, 80 A.D.3d 1065 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81  
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A.D.3d 1031 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Executive Department Board 
of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2001).   
 
            As to the seventh issue, in instances where release to community supervision is denied, the 
Board shall establish a date for reconsideration which shall not exceed 24 months from the date of 
the interview. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b); Matter of Abascal v. New 
York State Board of Parole, 23 A.D.3d 740 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Tatta v. State, 290 A.D.2d 
907 (3d Dept. 2002).  Therefore, the 24-month hold was proper. 
 
            As to the eighth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
            As to the ninth issue, regarding Appellant’s assertion that the Board failed to provide 
guidance as to how to improve his chances for parole, an inmate has no due process right to a 
statement from the Board as to what the inmate should do to improve chances for parole. Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 2005); Boothe v. 
Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
            As to the tenth issue, a COMPAS instrument was not prepared for Appellant due to 
cognitive impairment as authorized pursuant to Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision Directive 8500. 
 
 Finally, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges and 
administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 
914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory requirements and 
internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s possible release to 
parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence that the Board’s 
decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 
1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 




 It is the recommendation of the Appeals Unit that the Board’s decision be affirmed.     
